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Abstract
This paper is designed to offer an overview of the major events and policy issues
related to Arts 81, 82 and 86 EC in the last year. The paper follows the format of
previous years and is divided into three sections: — A general overview of major
events (legislation and notices, European Court cases and European Commission
decisions). — Anoutlineofcurrent policy issues, including legal privilege, private
actions and Art.82 guidelines. — Discussion of certain areas of specific inter-
est, notably competition and the liberal professions, energy, sport and media and
certain international issues.
This paper is designed to offer an overview of the
major events andpolicy issues related toArts 81, 82
and 86 EC in the last year.
The paper follows the format of previous years
and is divided into three sections:
— A general overview of major events (legis-
lation and notices, European Court cases and
European Commission decisions).
— Anoutlineofcurrentpolicy issues, including
legal privilege, private actions and Art.82
guidelines.
— Discussion of certain areas of specific inter-
est, notably competition and the liberal pro-
fessions, energy, sport andmedia and certain
international issues.
Legislation and European court judgments are
included in Part 1. The other sections will be
included in Part 2, published in the next journal.
In the author’s view there have been three major
themes this year.
The primary theme of the year in competition
terms was the combination of Enlargement, mod-
ernisation and centralisation, turning around the
focalpointofMay1,2004.On thatday,10countries
joined the EU, bringing a scale change and new
systems of competition enforcement. The notifi-
cations system stopped. The ‘‘European Compe-
tition network’’ started. National courts were also
given the right to apply Art.81(3) EC. The Transfer
of Technology Block Exemption entered into force,1
with market share ceilings and related Guidelines,
completing the modernisation of Art.81 EC legis-
lation.
Already, there have been developments with
Regulation1/2003,notablyplanned‘‘Article9’’ com-
mitment decisions2 and proceedings against pre-
viously notified practices, no longer covered by
immunity. Companies and their lawyers are think-
ing about ‘‘self-assessment’’ rather than ‘‘To notify
or not to notify?’’!
The second theme of the year has been ‘‘basics
litigation’’: In Volkswagen II and Bayer Adalat, on
thequestionas towhat is anagreement; inGraphite
Electrodes and Austrian Banks, questions as to
what material a company has to give the Commis-
sion in response to a request for information; and in
Akzo Nobel questions as to what legal professional
privilege covers. It is true that there are complex
issues also, suchaswhen, exceptionally, dominant
companies may have to license their IP as in IMS,
but it is striking to see basic issues like this coming
up again, issues which should perhaps be clear by
now.
The third theme has been the Commission’s
drive into the liberal professions. It appears that
the Commission wants to push far fast. The Com-
mission has started with a case involving Belgian
Architects and a ‘‘Communication’’ urging self-
review by the professions. It will be interesting to
see how the issues develop or whether (like, for
example, sport or air transport) matters will take a
while to clarify and sort out.
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cover merger control.
1. See, generally Commission Press Releases IP/04/511,
April 21, 2004; IP/04/411, March 30, 2004.
2. Commitment decisions; MEMO/04/217, September
17, 2004.
Box 1
 Major Themes in 2004
— Enlargement: 10 newMember States
* With modernisation and decentralisation
 No notifications/no immunity
 Shared Art.81(3) EC
 Now: Art.9 commitments and lapsed
notification cases?
— Basics litigation
* Still litigating what is an agreement
* Still litigating what the privilege against
self-incrimination means
* Still litigating what legal privilege is
* BUT also highly complex Art.82 issues
 E.g. compulsory licensing of IP
— Competition advocacy and the liberal
professions
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Overview of major events
Legislative developments (adopted and
proposed)
Adopted
May 1, 2004: Overview
OnMay1,2004, therewerehugechanges to theway
in which EC Competition law is enforced. Four
aspects apply to general competition, the fifth is a
new ECMerger Regulation with a new substantive
test, not covered in this paper3:
— First, the newEnlargement,with 10newEU
Member States.4 This is probably the most
important change, because it results in a
scale change in the size of the EU, which
moves from 15 to 25 Member States and a
much wider geographic scope for EC Com-
petition law.
— Secondly, the modernising features of
Council Regulation 1/2003.5 These came
into force on May 1, 2004. Above all with
the abolition of notifications to the Euro-
pean Commission (‘‘the Commission’’) for
clearance of agreements.
— Thirdly, the decentralisation aspects of
Council Regulation 1/2003. Above all, the
shared enforcement of the whole of Art.81
EC with national competition authorities
(‘‘NCAs’’) and national courts, meaning that
they can also apply Art.81(3) EC, as well as
the Commission.
— Fourthly, the new investigatory powers of
Regulation 1/2003. Above all, the new right
for theCommission to inspectprivate homes,
as well as company premises, if it is shown
that evidence of infringement is likely to be
there.
At the same time, a new procedural regulation
entered into force, Commission Regulation 773/
2004.6 In the Spring of 2004, the Commission also
finalised and adopted various notices on: Effect
on trade; Art.81(3) EC; co-operation amongst the
Commission and NCAs; co-operation amongst the
Commission, NCAs and national courts; informal
guidance on novel questions; and the handling of
complaints.7
Thesedocumentsweresummarised indetail last
year as drafts.8 Some have changed a little, but
generally they are much the same. (Key points are
noted below.)
Enlargement
Enlargement involves four key changes.
— First, the new NCAs join in the new ‘‘Eur-
opean Competition Network’’ (‘‘ECN’’) of
competition authorities, sharing enforce-
ment of the EC rules with the European
Commission (as well as enforcing their
own national rules).
— Secondly, since May 1, 2004, the Commis-
sion is able to intervene directly in the 10
new Member States, with inspections on
company premises and new, controversial
powers to carry out such inspections in
private homes.9
— Thirdly, there should be more focus on
restrictions on trade and competition (i)
among the 10 new Member States and (ii)
between the 10 newMember States and the
15 old EUMember States. Previously, com-
petition enforcement in or with these coun-
tries was a question for national laws or EC
law and the Europe Agreements. Direct ap-
plication of relevant EC rules is likely to be
more direct and focussed on cross-border
restrictions.
— Fourthly, in the new Member States, we
expect an enforcement drive on (i) ‘‘15 old
Member State companies’’ (who arguably
should know better) and (ii) also on former
monopoliesandoligopolies that cameabout
through privatisation and still hold domi-
nant positions.
Modernisation
This has been going on for some time. Seven points
may be noted now.
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3. See,WilmerCutlerPickeringHaleandDorrLLP,Guide
to ECMerger Regulation (4th ed., September 2004).
4. Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta,
Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and the Czech Republic.
5. [2003] O.J. L1/1.
6. [2004] O.J. L123/18.
7. All are conveniently grouped in [2004] O.J. C101 and
are otherwise available on the Commission’s website. See,
also Gauer, Kjølbye, Dalheimer, De Smijter, Schnichels
and Laurila, EC Commission Competition Policy Newslet-
ter (Summer 2004), pp.1–6.
8. [2004] I.C.C.L.R. 25–32.
9. Art.21 of Council Regulation 1/2003.
Box 2
 Legislation/Notices
— Regulation 1/2003 and the related
decentralisation package
* N.B. Leniency provisions
* A narrowing of Art.81(1) EC?
— New Transfer of Technology Block
Exemption
* Key new distinctions/limits
* Related ‘‘IP Guidelines’’
* N.B. 4 technologies ‘‘de minimis’’ rule
— Extension of EC procedural framework in air
transport to third country routes
* Finally!
— N.B. New draft revised Access to File Notice
just published
http://law.bepress.com/wilmer/art46
— First, theCommissionhassought to focuson
restrictions on competition by those with
market power, involving more significant
effects, with a greater emphasis on econ-
omic assessments than previously. In prac-
tice, that has meant vertical and horizontal
block exemptions with market share ceil-
ings and related guidelines, setting a review
framework for situations where companies
have market power and are not covered by
the block exemption’s ‘‘safe harbours’’.
— Secondly, the Commission has also moder-
nised its legislation to fit a system with no
notificationsfor ‘‘exemption’’since, fromMay
2004, this was abolished. In practice, this
means that companies and their advisers
now cannot notify to obtain immunity
from fines, if there is a perceived risk that
an arrangement couldbeviewedsounfavour-
ably as to justify them. There is still a possi-
bility toobtainguidance fromtheCommission
on cases involving novel questions, but this
is intended to be of limited application,
for ‘‘genuinely unresolved’’ questions. The
Commission has also removed ‘‘grey-listed’’
(possibly unlawful) clauses from block ex-
emptions and the related ‘‘opposition pro-
cedures’’ for tacit approval of notified
agreements.
— Thirdly, although the focus on economic
assessments is generally welcome, it has
been at a price in terms of legal certainty.
Notably, the introduction of market share
ceilings on block exemptions means that
there may often bemore insecurity for com-
panies. For example, if the relevant market
for supply of a product is European, then
one approach can be taken for Europe as a
whole. If, on the other hand, there are na-
tional or regionalmarketswith variations in
market positions and market power, then
correspondingvariationsmayberequiredto
the agreements to reflect these factual vari-
ations. Probably this should be welcomed
insofaras itmayleadtomoreprecise,correct
factual assessments, but itwillmake simple
co-ordination of ‘‘European’’ wide trading
positions difficult in many cases.
— Fourthly, there will also be more insecurity
insofar as there will not be exemptions for a
given period of time. This concern can be
exaggerated, insofar as there were only few
actual exemption decisions and a great deal
of private practice has been about moving
companies into broadly acceptable pos-
itions, with some risk of challenge but
good arguments in defence, rather than no-
tifying. That hasnot changed.Nevertheless,
a clear issue ishowtimewill be treated inEC
competition rulings before NCAs and
courts. It is no longer a question of a forward
looking prediction for a period, justifying
‘‘exemption’’. It ismore of a ‘‘snapshot’’ as to
whether, at a given moment, a restriction is
anti-competitive. Itwill be interesting to see
if this will lead to different results in future
rulings. It also remains to be seen for how
long clearance decisions will be effective,
given the risk that plaintiffs may seek their
review and may not be clearly prevented
from doing so, as with a formal exemption
decision.
— Fifthly, it should be emphasised that the
process of modernisation is also not over.
This yearwe saw the third general area to be
covered,withmodernisationof theTransfer
of Technology Block Exemption. However,
there have also been discussions as to mod-
ernising Art.82 EC enforcement, with draft
guidelines to come, it is suggestednext year.
Related to this, the Commission has indi-
cated in its TransferTechnologyGuidelines
and Notice on Art.81(3) EC that dominant
companies may have more scope to benefit
from Art.81(3) EC, provided that the prac-
tice in question is not abusive.10 This may
well mean that the Vertical Restraints and
Horizontal Guidelines will need related re-
vision, since they both generally treat domi-
nance, not abuse as the limit for Art.81(3)
application.11
— Sixthly, since May 2004, the Commission
appears to have started proceedings against
various practices which had been notified
previouslyandwhose fine immunity lapsed
with the entry into force of Regulation 1/
2003, changing the situation hugely for
those involved. (Someof thesearedescribed
below.)
— Finally, the numerous new rules and
‘‘guidelines’’ will have to be tested to see
how they work in practice. Phrases in the
nownumerous guidelines are useful, but no
substitute for actual cases.
Decentralisation
There are also a few points on decentralisation
which merit special mention.
First, special thoughthasbeendevoted to shared
enforcement and the varying leniencyprogrammes
in most but not all EUMember States.
This has resulted in special undertakings by
NCAs that information submitted by leniency ap-
plicants will not be passed on to another authority,
without the consent of the leniency applicant,
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10. [2004] O.J. C102/2, para.151; [2004] O.J. C101/97,
para.106.
11. See theVerticalGuidelines, [2000]O.J. C291/1, paras
153, 211 and 222;Horizontal Guidelines, [2001] O.J. C3/2,
para.36.
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unless either the applicant has also applied for
leniency in the same case before the receiving
authority or the receiving authority has given a
specific commitment not to use the information
transmitted to impose sanctions on the leniency
applicant or on its staff.12 The Commission has
also indicated in the Notice on co-operation with
national courts that itwill not transmit to anational
court information voluntarily submitted by a le-
niency applicant without the consent of that ap-
plicant.13
Otherwise, because of the risk that a cartel case
maybepassed todifferentenforcingauthoritiesone
maynote thatmultiple applications for leniency (at
NCA and Commission level) may often still be
advisable.
Secondly, it will be recalled that there is a rebut-
table presumption that trade between Member
States is not capable of being affected when the
aggregate annual EU turnover of the companies
concerned does not exceed e40 million and the
aggregate market share of the parties on any rel-
evant market within the EU affected by the agree-
ment does not exceed 5 per cent.14
Thirdly, there has been a fair amount of dis-
cussion about the Art.81(3) EC Notice. Notably, it
is argued that the Notice has narrowed the scope of
application of Art.81(1) EC while making the
Art.81(3) EC ‘‘exception’’ very demanding.
What is new for a Commission text is the state-
ment that some market power is required for
Art.81(1) EC to apply.Wehave always talked about
the ‘‘appreciability’’ of restrictions. Now the Com-
mission is going beyond ‘‘de minimis’’ effect con-
cepts to say that, where effect is the basis for
infringing Art.81(1) EC, some consumer impact
and/or market power must be shown:
‘‘For an agreement to be restrictive by effect it must
affect actual orpotential competition to suchanextent
that on the relevant market negative effects on prices,
output, innovation or the variety or quality of goods
and services can be expectedwith a reasonable degree
of probability’’.15
This is welcome insofar as one would think it is
right to focus resources on the more important
cases. What is troublesome, however, is that this
may not be an easy line to define in practice.16 The
Commission says that all this simply reflects the
modernviewthatbothplaintiffs and regulators and
defendantsmust have real evidence to substantiate
their claims that Art.81(1) EC is infringed, or that
Art.81(3) EC is met. If so, this is welcome, but it is
true that, as drafted, the Art.81(3) EC Notice por-
trays that provision as the ‘‘exception’’ rather than a
rule often met.
Fourthly, it is clear that the advice which prac-
titioners are giving has already changed. Until now
the tendencyhas been to assess closely the enforce-
ment practice of the Commission in a certain field.
Such assessments are now much more difficult,
insofar as the test is whether any competition
authority or court dealing with the case would
find an infringement or would be likely to apply
Art.81(3) EC. Practitioners therefore have to give a
more general and, perhaps, more objective assess-
ment than previously.
Fifthly, the Commission will still be key on the
big issues. For the ‘‘Art.10’’ declaratory decisions
(which only it can take and which are specifically
designed to clarify the position on certain types of
newor importantpractice17) andalsobecauseof the
principles confirmed in the European Court of
Justice (‘‘ECJ’’) Masterfoods judgment.18 It will be
recalled that this judgment requires that national
authorities and courts do not take decisions that
run counter to a Commission decision or are likely
to run counter to a Commission decision in pro-
ceedings on the same issue ormatter. NCAdecisions
also still have to be co-ordinatedwith the Commis-
sion and other authorities. If a NCA were not to
follow agreed EC Competition law, the Commission
couldstilldecideto takeoveracase19 so, to thatextent
also, Brussels still has a special role to play.
Sixthly, there are some important points to note
onwork-sharing. SinceMay 1, 2004, a competition
case can be dealt with by aNCAor the Commission
in Brussels or handled by several NCAs or before a
national court.
According to the principles of work-sharing, a
‘‘material link’’ between the infringement and the
enforcingauthorityorauthorities is required. Itwill
be recalled that the key principles are that an
authority is considered ‘‘well-placed’’ to deal with
a case if (i) the behaviour of the parties has substan-
tial effects for the territory inwhich the authority is
based; (ii) the authority can effectively gather all
relevant information; and (iii) the authority can
effectively bring the infringement to an end.20
We expect those cases with their main compet-
itive impact in a single Member State to be dealt
with by the ‘‘local’’ NCA, since it should be best
placed to deal with the case, unless a special prin-
ciple or precedent is involved, in which case the
matter may be dealt with by the Commission. On
the other hand, if three or more EUMember States
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12. Paras 39–42 of the ‘‘Notice on Co-operation between
CompetitionAuthorities’’; see also, Blake and Schnichels,
EC Commission Competition Policy Newsletter (Summer
2004), pp.7–13.
13. Para.26 of the ‘‘Notice on Co-operationwithNational
Courts’’.
14. Para.52 of the ‘‘Notice on Effect on Trade’’.
15. Paras 24–27 of the ‘‘Notice on Art.81(3) EC’’.
16. See also Kjølbye, ‘‘The New Commission Guidelines
on the Application of Article 81(1)’’ [2004] E.C.L.R. 566.
17. Art.10 and recital (14) of Council Regulation 1/2003.
18. Case C–344/98, [2000] E.C.R. I-11369, available on
the European Court of Justice website.
19. See Art.11(6) of Council Regulation 1/2003.
20. Paras 8–9 of the ‘‘Notice on Co-operation between
Competition Authorities’’.
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are affectedbya restriction,weexpect the case tobe
handled inBrussels. In between, theremay be joint
action by NCAs or action by one NCA.
This may become a developing area. For exam-
ple, it may be of interest to note that the Nordic
competition authorities often appear to co-operate
together and have signed an official agreement on
such procedures. It may be that, in the years to
come, interventions by other combinations of au-
thorities, for example, theSpanish andPortuguese,
or the Austrian, Czech and Slovak authorities
should be expected.
Inpractice, onemayalso expect theCommission
to pass cases to NCAs more willingly, unless it is
thought that they may not be dealt with for lack of
resources or other factors. The Commission could
do this before, notably invoking Automec II,21 but
now it has even more incentive to do so, because it
can leave the actual case to others and still be
involved through the ECN.
Finally, it is emphasised that in applying EC
Competition law the national authorities will fol-
low their national procedural rules, which may
involve important distinctions. For example, on
recognition of legal professional privilege, which
may be different where national rules apply to EC
competition enforcement. Thus, in Portugal, it is
argued that in-house counsel, who are still mem-
bers of the Portuguese Bar, have such privilege.
There are also variations in national practice on
the privilege against self-incrimination.
The TTBE and related guidelines
The new Transfer of Technology Block Exemption
(‘‘TTBE’’) Commission Regulation 772/2004 and
related guidelines (the ‘‘Transfer Technology’’ or
‘‘IP’’Guidelines)were adoptedonApril 7, 2004and
entered into force onMay 1, 2004.22
The main principles are as follows:
Transfer of Technology Block Exemption
First, the new TTBE reflects two key changes in
comparison to the old one: (i) a distinction is made
between competitors and non-competitors and
(ii) the Block Exemption (‘‘BE’’) is only available
up to certain market share ceilings. Thus,
— If an agreement involves competitorswhich
together have more than 20 per cent of the
relevant technology or product market then
the agreement cannot benefit from the BE.
— If an agreement involves non-competitors
either of which on its own has more than
30 per cent market share on the relevant
technology or product market, then again
the benefit of the BE cannot be claimed.
Critically therefore some market assessment must
now be made. Different ‘‘black-lists’’ for unaccept-
able provisions apply (so-called ‘‘hardcore’’ pro-
visions). Whether companies are competitors is
assessed at the time the agreement is entered into
and, importantly, that status is retainedeven if they
subsequently become competitors, unless there are
substantial amendments to the agreement later.
Secondly, the BE applies to software copyright
licensing, but not generally to licensing of rights in
performancesandother copyright, andnot to trade-
marks. Licencesmust be for production of contract
products, not just resale, and licences must be
between two parties. The BE is also applicable to
sub-licensing and sub-contracting provided that
the primary purpose of the licence remains the
production of contract products.23 Settlement and
non-assertion agreements are now normally cov-
ered by the BE.24
Thirdly, restrictions on a licensee using sever-
able improvements and/or requiring their exclus-
ive licensing or assignment to the licensor and no-
challenge clauses are excluded from theBE. (Itmay
be useful to recall that including ‘‘hardcore’’ pro-
visions in an agreement means that the whole
agreement falls outside the BE. An ‘‘excluded’’
provision just falls outside the BE to be assessed
individually.)
Fourthly, the hardcore restrictions list has been
revised as between the draft and the final TTBE.
— For competitors, the main black-listed pro-
visions are: maximum andminimumprice-
fixing, reciprocaloutput limitations,certain
market-sharing provisions and restrictions
on a licensee’s ability to exploit its own
technology or pursue its own separate
R&D. The BE is stricter for reciprocal than
non-reciprocal agreements between com-
petitors. Non-reciprocal output restrictions
betweencompetitorsarenowcoveredbythe
BE.
— In the case of non-competitors, the main
hardcore restrictions are: minimum resale
price maintenance, certain passive sales
and restrictions on sales where a licensee
is in a selective distribution system.
— The TTBE allows active sales bans on li-
censor and/or licensee, as well as customer
and territorial restrictions on the licensor.
— It is noteworthy that, between non-com-
petitors, you can restrict passive sales into
the territory or customer group of another
licensee during the first two years in which
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21. Case T–24/90, Automec v Commission [1992] E.C.R.
II-2223.
22. [2004] O.J. L123/11 and [2004] O.J. C101/2. IP/04/
470, April 7, 2004. With thanks to Cormac O’Daly for his
assistance with this section. See also [2004] I.C.C.L.R. 22.
23. See the IP Guidelines, paras 42 and 44.
24. See the IP Guidelines, paras 43 and 204–209.
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
the licensee is selling contract products in
that territory.25
Fifthly, new licences have to comply with these
rules already. Existing licences have to be brought
into line byMarch 31, 2006 or fall to be considered
under the general rules, not benefiting from the BE.
Transfer Technology Guidelines
These Guidelines are extensive. They explain the
general application ofArt.81(1) EC to licensing and
thepositionof theTTBEincomparison tootherBEs
(such as Joint R&D and Vertical Restraints). They
include comment on the TTBE itself and focus on
certain types of agreement, considering the pos-
ition if they are not covered by the TTBE.
Someof themore important general points are as
follows:
— Outside the area of hardcore restrictions,
Art.81 EC is considered unlikely to be in-
fringed where there are four or more inde-
pendently controlled, commercially viable,
substitutable technologies on the relevant
market, in addition to those controlled by
the parties to the licensing agreement.26
— Market shares in technology markets are
calculated for the purpose of the TTBE by
reference to sales of products incorporating
the licensed technology.27
— On a technology market, the parties are
considered to be actual competitors, if the
licensee is already licensing competing tech-
nology, apparently irrespective of where.28
Potential competition on the technology
market is not taken into account for the
application of the BE.29 However, potential
competition may be relevant when asses-
sing an agreement which falls outside the
BE.30
— If the parties’ own technologies are in a
blocking position vis-a`-vis another tech-
nology, the parties are considered to be non-
competitors on the technology market. The
Commission clearly will be critical before
accepting such a claim.31
— If a licensed technology represents such a
major (or breakthrough) innovation that the
technologyof the licenseebecomesobsolete
or uncompetitive, then licensor and licen-
see may not be considered competitors.32
— The buyer power of the purchaser of li-
censed products is taken into account in
assessing whether the parties to the licence
have market power (in individual assess-
ment cases).33
— TheCommission appears open to economic
arguments on the application of Art.81(1)
and (3) EC: ‘‘Article 81 cannot be applied
without considering the ex ante invest-
ments and the risks related thereto. The
risk facing the parties and the sunk invest-
ment that must be committed to implement
the agreement can thus lead to the agree-
ment falling outside Article 81(1) EC or
fulfilling the conditions of Article 81(3)
EC, as the case may be, for the period of
time required to recoup the investment’’.34
— As noted above, the Commission refers to
the limits of Art.81(3) EC clearance as ‘‘pre-
cluding any application of the exception
rule to restrictive agreements that constitute
an abuse of a dominant position’’35 (empha-
sis added). Therefore, the fact that an agree-
ment is concluded by a dominant firm does
not in itself act as a bar to exemption.
Thereafter the Commission discusses various spe-
cific obligations/restrictions:
 Royalties
 Exclusive licensing and sales restrictions
 Output restrictions
 Field of use restrictions
 Captive use restrictions
 Tying and bundling
 Non-compete obligations
 Settlement and non-assertion agreements
 Technology pools
Running through this part of the Guidelines is
the theme that a licensor is not expected to create
direct competition to himself. There is also a gen-
eral sliding scale of concern: reciprocal agreements
between competitors are treated most cautiously
(fearing that they amount to simple market-sharing);
then non-reciprocal agreements between competi-
tors; and then agreements between non-competitors.
The following points are of particular interest,
where an agreement is not covered by the BE.
Generally, so-called ‘‘running royalties’’ (mean-
ing royalties based onproduct sales) are considered
to be a normal form of revenue collection.
However, in a limited number of cases, royalty
obligations between competitorsmay be viewed as
price-fixing, e.g. where competitors cross-license
and provide for reciprocal running royalties and
it is considered that the licence is devoid of a
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25. Art.4(2)(b)(ii) TTBE.
26. Para.131.
27. Para.23.
28. Para.28.
29. Para.30.
30. Para.66.
31. Para.32.
32. Para.33.
33. Para.137.
34. Para.147.
35. Para.151.
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pro-competitive purpose.36 In addition, the Com-
mission considers that calculating royalties on the
basis of all licensee sales, regardless ofwhether the
licensed technology is being used, is a hardcore
restriction deterring a licensee from using his own
technology.37
With respect to exclusive licensing between
competitors, outside the TTBE, the Commission
will examine the competitive significance of the
licensor. Where the licensor is only competing on
the technology market and is, for example, a small
research institute, there is unlikely to be an in-
fringement of Art.81(1) EC.38 Exclusive licensing
tonon-competitors isviewed favourably. Itmaynot
fall within Art.81(1) EC at all. If it does, the Com-
mission states that it will generally fulfil the con-
ditions of Art.81(3) EC. It is acknowledged that
exclusivity may be required in order to induce
investment by a licensee.39 However, it is said that
intervention may be warranted where a dominant
licenseeobtains anexclusive licenceandentry into
the technology market is difficult.40
Above the BEmarket share ceiling non-reciprocal
sales restrictions between competitors may be
within Art.81(1) EC, if either licensor or licensee
hasmarket power. However, such restrictionsmay
be indispensable to protect other licensees’ invest-
ments.41 Outside the BE, sales restrictions imposed
between non-competitors are still viewed favour-
ably. Restrictions on a licensee may fall outside
Art.81(1) EC, if without the restrictions, the licens-
ingwouldnotoccur.Atechnologyowner isalsonot
expected to create competition with himself, so
restrictions on a licensor are likely to fulfil the con-
ditions of Art.81(3) EC.42 Between licensees, while
restrictions on active sales may fulfil Art.81(3) EC,
the Commission considers that Art.81(3) EC is
unlikely to apply to restrictions on passive sales
exceeding the two year period provided for in
Art.4(2)(b).43
Non-reciprocal output restrictions between com-
petitors can now come within the BE. The favour-
able approach continues outside the BE, as Art.81(3)
EC is said to be likely to apply, at least where the
licensor’s technology is substantially better than
the licensee’s and the output restriction substan-
tially exceeds the licensee’s output prior to the
agreement.44 The argument is that such restrictions
may be required as an incentive for the licensor to
grant the licence in the first place.
On field of use restrictions, the Commission
emphasises that the parties have to define their
fields of use objectively by reference to ‘‘identified
andmeaningful characteristics of the licensed pro-
duct’’ or they risk a finding that the restriction
constitutes a customer restriction.45 Reciprocal
field of use clauses between competitors, when
combined with exclusive or sole territories, are
considered to be hardcore restrictions.46 There is
also some caution with regard to cross-licensing
between competitors, where an agreement pro-
vides for asymmetrical field of use restrictions,
i.e. where one party is permitted to use the tech-
nologywithinoneproductmarketor technical field
andtheother ispermitted touse itwithinadifferent
product market or field of use.47
Complex as this all is, it is a huge improvement
on theoldTTBE.However, clearly the introduction
of market share ceilings creates new uncertainties.
We still do not know a lot about how the Commis-
sion will deal with situations involving market
power.48 In addition, there is much work to do
now, seeing if existing licences need revision or
termination, given changes under the new rules.
Air transport between the EU and third countries
In February 2004, the EU Council adopted Council
Regulation 411/2004, giving the European Com-
mission a procedural framework to review airline
transactions which have an impact on routes be-
tween the EU and third countries.49 No more com-
plex, direct reliance on the EC Treaty and complex
co-operation with national authorities for inter-
vention in Airline Alliance cases (although pre-
sumably such co-operation will continue, but now
under the general ‘‘ECN’’ framework). Previously
theCommissionhad to rely on (what is now)Art.85
EC, (the formerArt.89EC),whichwas cumbersome
anddid not confer on theCommission the power to
impose remedies.50
The change appears to have come about mainly
because of the ECJ’s judgment in the ‘‘Open Skies’’
cases in 2002,51 which established that Member
States acted illegallywhen they entered into agree-
mentswith theUnited States on a number of issues
where the Community has exclusive competence.
It also fits in with the new spirit of ECN enforce-
ment, especially as the Airline Alliance cases
patently have broad EU implications.
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Proposed
Market access to port services
In October 2004, the Commission adopted a new
proposal for a Directive on Market Access to Port
Services, which would introduce specific rules on
access to port services and aiming at the creation of
a levelplaying field incompetitionbetweenports.52
The proposal addresses two main issues: (a) intra-
port competition (competition between providers
of the same port servicewithin a port) and (b) inter-
port competition (competition between ports).
The Directive applies to ports with 1.5 million
tonnes and/or 200,000 passengers per year. The
services concerned are pilotage, towage, mooring
cargo and passenger handling.
As regards intra-port competition, authoris-
ations for service providers are mandatory and a
system for providing authorisations is established.
The Directive requires objective, transparent and
non-discriminatory criteria for granting authoris-
ations,which should be relevant, proportional and
public.
The method used for granting the authorisation
determines what will happen in the event of a later
limitation in the number of service providers of a
port service. Thus, when such a limitation arises,
authorisations which have been granted through
a selection procedure must remain unchanged,
whereas authorisations which have been granted
without a selection procedure are to be terminated
and reconsideredwith a selectionprocedure. Com-
pensation is foreseen for the existing service pro-
vider forpast,not fullyamortised investments, ifhe
does not win the selection procedure. As regards
pilotage, authorisations may be subject to criteria
related to public service obligations and maritime
safety. Self-handling should be allowed subject to
an authorisation, granted in an efficient and ex-
pedient manner and remain in force for as long as
theself-handlercomplieswith thecriteria forgrant-
ing it.
As regards inter-port competition, themanaging
body of the port is required to have transparent
accounting. The Financial Transparency Directive
is considered applicable to all ports covered by the
proposed Directive. State Aid guidelines are to be
adopted by the Commission within a year after the
adoption of the Directive.
Access to file
InOctober2004, theCommissionpublishedaCom-
munication inviting comments on a draft Access to
FileNotice to replace the previous one from1997.53
The draft takes into account (amongst other things)
Regulation 1/2003 and recent case law such as the
CFI Cement judgment.
The following are the main points of interest for
general enforcement (not focussing on separate
merger control issues):
— The Commission continues with the pos-
ition that access to file is a right of defence
and therefore can only be asserted after a
Statement ofObjections.54 (This is a point of
continued controversy where many argue
that principles of fairness and good admin-
istration should allowearlier access, at least
for the parties.)
— Importantly for cartel leniency cases,where
minutes are taken and agreed by the under-
taking in question, they may be accessible
after deletion of any business secrets or
other confidential information (and may be
evidence relied on in the case).55
— Most documents passing within the ECN
will not be accessible.However, documents
emanating from Member States, the EFTA
Surveillance Authority or EFTA Statesmay
be disclosedwhere they contain allegations
brought against aparty that theCommission
must examine, or that form part of the evi-
dence in the investigativeprocess, similar to
documents from private parties.56
— Material may be withheld, if its disclosure
would significantlyharmapersonorunder-
taking. This may be used to protect anony-
mous complainants or third parties where
retaliation is feared.57 (It is, however, a right
which defendants dislike because they fear
they are missing part of the case against
them.)
— TheCommission states that it generally pre-
sumes that turnover, sales, market-share
and similar data which is more than five
years old is no longer confidential.58
— The draft notice underlines that even confi-
dential informationmay have to be disclosed
if it is necessary to prove an infringement or
to exonerate a party.59
— The draft Notice states that in Art.81 and 82
cases, access will be granted ‘‘on one single
occasion’’. Generally, no access is given
to replies of other parties to Statements of
Objections, although further access may be
necessary if documents received after the
issue of the Statement of Objections consti-
tute new evidence against a party.60
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— Complainantsdonothave the same rights of
access as parties, but may be given access to
documents on which the Commission has
based its provisional assessment if they
contest theCommission’s rejectionofacom-
plaint.61
— There are procedures for appeals on confi-
dentiality issues to the Hearing Officer.
Finally and importantly again for (plaintiff) cartel
cases, the Commission underlines that access is
only for the purposes of its administrative proceed-
ings. If documents are used otherwise and counsel
are involved, the Commission may complain to
national bars.62This is abig issue since the sanction
appearsweak and onemay also think that the focus
should be on the party, not the lawyer. Apparently
in the Austrian Banks cartel case, a political party
wasadmittedasa thirdparty to theproceedingsand
made thenon-confidential StatementofObjections
public despite an instruction from the Hearing
Officer not to do so!63
Liner shipping conferences
InOctober 2004, theCommissionadopteda ‘‘White
Paper’’ aiming to bring more competition to the
maritime sector.64 The Commission suggested mod-
ifying or repealing the existing Council Regulation
4056/86 on the application of Arts 81 and 82 EC to
maritime transport, or replacing it with other in-
struments, such as guidelines.
It will be recalled that shipping companies
have traditionally organised themselves as liner
conferences, whereby they would agree common
or uniform freight rates in order to provide regular
scheduled maritime transport services to shippers
and freight forwarders. The 1986 Regulation con-
tains rules which exempt price-fixing, capacity
regulation and other agreements or consultation
between liner shipping companies from Arts 81
and 82 EC. The justification for these exemptions
has been the view that the rate-setting and other
activities of liner conferences lead to stable freight
rates, allowing shippers to offer reliable scheduled
maritime transport services. As noted last year, the
Commission is campaigning for modernisation,
repealing these exemptions.65
European Court cases (ECJ and CFI)
Article 82 EC cases
BA Virgin
In December 2003, the Court of First Instance
(‘‘CFI’’) upheld the Commission’s decision in BA/
Virgin.66 British Airways (‘‘BA’’) had appealed
against the Commission’s decision that it had
abused its dominant position as a purchaser of UK
air travel agency services, by applying a growth
bonus. The Commission fined BA e6.8 million.
There has beenmuch discussion about the judg-
ment (as Michelin II67), mainly because dominant
companies would like to be allowed to use incen-
tive bonuses and see them as ‘‘normal compe-
tition’’.
BA had agreements with travel agents in the
United Kingdom in order to sell tickets there. Until
1997, BA applied two flat rate commissions: 9 per
cent for international tickets and 7.5 per cent for
domestic tickets. In addition, BA applied various
financial incentives, includingaperformancebonus,
calculated by reference to the growth of sales of BA
tickets from one financial year to another.
Subsequently, after a complaint by Virgin and
a Commission procedure, in 1998 BA adopted a
different systemofperformancebonusesbasedona
new, lower basic commission rate of 7 per cent on
all tickets sold (irrespective of destination), with
an extra commission of up to 3 per cent on inter-
national tickets and 1 per cent on domestic tickets
for growth in sales. Growth was measured against
the corresponding month in the previous year.
Bonuses applied not only to the growth element,
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but also to all sales of BA tickets during the refer-
ence period in question.
On a second complaint by Virgin, the Commis-
sion found thatBAhadinfringedArt.82EC.BAwas
considered a dominant purchaser of travel agency
services for distributing tickets in the United King-
dom. The Commission found essentially two abus-
ive aspects in BA’s performance bonus system:
— There was discrimination insofar as BA’s
reward scheme could entail the application
of different commission rates to an identical
amount of revenue, because the rate of in-
crease in sales of BA tickets could differ
from one agency to another.
— The systemwas loyalty inducing, because it
restricted agents’ freedom to supply their
services to other airlines, without the sys-
tem being based on any economically justi-
fied consideration.
The CFI agreed. Several points may be noted.
First, the Court found that it made no difference
that BAwas a dominant purchaser (as opposed to a
seller) of services. Article 82 EC applies equally to
companies in a dominant position in relation to
their suppliers and those in the same position as
regards their customers.68
Secondly, the Court found that it did not matter
that BA might not be dominant in the transport
markets affected by its conduct on the agency
services market. Quoting Commercial Solvents,69
the Court stated that an abuse committed on a
dominated product market, the effects of which
are felt in a separatemarket onwhich the company
concerned does not hold a dominant position,may
fall within Art.82 EC, provided that the separate
market is closely connected to the first.70 This was
the case here.
Thirdly, BA was found to be in a dominant
position despite a fall of some 6per cent in its share
of air ticket sales handled bymembers of the largest
UK travel association in the previous four years.
The Court noted that BA still had almost 40 per
cent, a multiple of its nearest rivals (such as Virgin
on 5.5 per cent) and still had a ‘‘very largely pre-
ponderantshare’’of theagents’business.Moreover,
BA offered more routes and frequencies from the
United Kingdom than its rivals, so it was an obliga-
tory business partner for travel agents there. The
Court also considered that the way that BA had
reduced the flat rate commission to introduce its
new combined flat rate and performance based
systemwas indicative of market power.71
Fourthly, the Court upheld the Commission’s
position on discrimination.72
Fifthly, theCourt repeatedwhathasnowbecome
the classic explanation of the fidelity rebate rules.73
Dominant companies have a special responsibility
not to distort competition. A dominant company
may defend its commercial interests, but not with
behaviour whose purpose is to strengthen that
dominant position.
A system of rebates whose effect is to prevent
customers from obtaining supplies from market
competitors is considered abusive for a dominant
company. Quantity rebate schemes linked to ef-
ficiencies and economies of scale which result in
lower tariffs to customers are lawful, but, where
such positive effects are not proved, an unlawful
‘‘fidelity-building’’ effect may be inferred. Actual
exclusionary effects donot have to be shown, if it is
clear that the conduct concerned is capable of
having, or likely to have, such an effect.74
Sixthly, on the facts the Court found that BA’s
system was ‘‘fidelity-building’’. The Court noted
that the system gave greatly increasing rewards to
travel agents for increased sales anddisproportion-
ate reductions in the rate of performance reward if
an agent’s sales of BA tickets fell. The Court agreed
with the Commission that BA’s rivals could not
attain a ‘‘level of revenue capable of constituting a
sufficiently broad financial base to allow them
effectively to establish a reward scheme similar to
BA’s in order to counter the exclusionary effect of
that scheme’’.75
To the extent that BA granted additional com-
mission on all tickets sold, rather than on just the
tickets sold once a sales target was reached, the
Court also found that there was no objective econ-
omic justification for the scheme. As such, BAwas
found to have had ‘‘no interest’’ in applying the
schemeother than ousting rival airlines.76 The like-
lihoodof exclusionaryeffectshadalsobeenshown,
given that 85 per cent of all air tickets in theUnited
Kingdom were sold through agents, which gener-
ally had to do business with BA. Norwas it necess-
ary to show damage to consumers, if there was
objective detriment to the structure of competition
itself77 (relying on Continental Can78).
Finally, the Court rejected BA’s argument that it
hada legitimate interest in the rebate scheme (other
than ousting rivals). BA argued that the incentive
scheme should be accepted: (i) because it was im-
possible to calculate the precise cost savings in-
volved in particular ticket supply; and (ii) because,
given the air transport industry’s high fixed costs,
improvements in capacity utilisation yielded lower
average unit costs, which BA is entitled to share
with agents and customers. The Court would not
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accept this. It noted the lack of precise correlation
between the amount of benefit from increased seat
occupancy and the amount of performance bonus
to the agent. It even considered that the amount of
increased rewards payable to agents might exceed
the profits to BA from the higher occupancy rate.79
Interestingly, this was not the same chamber
of the CFI as in Michelin II. Within a few months
therefore, the CFI has confirmed its orthodox pos-
ition on fidelity rebates twice in clear terms. Given
that modernisation of Art.82 ECwas already in the
air, it may be thought that the CFI wished to point
out clearly that it does notwish these specific rules
to change.
In practical terms, afterMichelin andBA/Virgin,
it is confirmed that dominant companies should
generally avoid performance bonuses based on
individualised growth, payable retrospectively on
all sales achieved. However, one may think that
standard scales of increased rewards, backed by
reasonablyprecise, proven economic justifications
and payment of rebate just on additional sales after
a given scale step, should be lawful. That will not
allow dominant companies to do everything their
smaller competitors can (which will remain con-
troversial), but itwill allowcompanies to give some
incentives for increased performance.
Itmaybe thought somewhatharshof theCourt to
have found no legitimate interest on the part of BA
inthescheme.PartofBA’saimappears tohavebeen
to reduce a large ‘‘flat rate’’ commission approach
and replace it with a more performance based
system,whichmaywell be laudable in competitive
terms. Unfortunately, as so often happens in these
cases, certain additional, arguably non-essential,
features of a bonus scheme may affect its whole
characterisation and mean that it is condemned
rather thanupheld. The key for thedominant under-
taking is to see whether they actually need those
extra features, given their market strength.
IMS
In April 2004, the ECJ gave its judgment in a
preliminary ruling concerning the IMS Health/NDC
Health case.80 We have noted the parallel European
Commission and Court proceedings before.81
The case arose because IMS Health (‘‘IMS’’) de-
veloped awayof gathering informationonpharma-
ceutical sales and prescriptions in Germany, using
amatrix for classificationof the information, called
a ‘‘brick’’ structure. This structure involves some
1860 ‘‘bricks’’ or units, on the basis of which IMS
Health had been selling regional data to pharma-
ceutical companies. There was evidence (although
also some dispute) about the extent to which the
customers for this information had helped IMS to
develop the structure. IMS claimed copyright in it
(a position confirmed in German courts).
A former employee of IMS started to offer com-
peting services based on a different classification
structure, butwith little success becausecustomers
argued that the data had to follow the ‘‘1860’’
structure (or other structures based on it) to be
comparable with earlier studies and because it
was theacceptedstructure. In thosecircumstances,
NDC (which had acquired the former employee’s
business) argued that the brick structure was a de
facto legal standard and that IMS shouldbe obliged
to license it to NDC, or else it would eliminate all
competition.
The Commission agreed with NDC in these ex-
ceptional circumstances and ordered interimmea-
sures. However, the CFI subsequently suspended
such measures, pending the determination of the
mainproceedings,mainly for reasons related to the
balanceofconvenience.Later theCommissionthen
withdrew its order on the basis of lack of urgency.
In parallel, IMShad sued for breach of copyright
and an injunction to stop NDC using its brick
structure, by proceedings before the Frankfurt
Landgericht.
Importantly, the referring court found that IMS
had distributed its ‘‘brick structures’’ free of charge
to pharmacies and doctors’ surgeries, which had
helped the structures to become the normal indus-
try standard to which its clients adapted their
information and distribution systems. The Court
then made a reference to the ECJ, considering that,
if there were an abuse of dominant position, IMS
wouldhave to license. Therewere essentially three
questions:
(1) Was it abusive to refuse a copyright licence
where the licensee seeks access to the same
market on which the owner of the copyright
has a dominant position?
(2) Is it relevant that the owner had involved
customers increatingthedatabankprotected
by copyright?
(3) Is it relevant toconsider the ‘‘materialoutlay/
costs’’whichclientswouldincur if theywere
to go over to a competitor, when considering
the abusive conduct of the copyright owner.
The ECJ’s answers were essentially ‘‘yes’’ to ques-
tions 2 and 3 and ‘‘it depends’’ to question 1.
The Court looked first at whether access to the
brick structure was ‘‘indispensable’’ and in the
process considered questions 2 and 3. Applying
Bronner,82 the Court held that, for a product or
service to be indispensable, it had to be established
at least that the creation of competing products or
services was not economically viable on a scale
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comparable to that of the undertaking which con-
trolled the existing product or service. If it were
proven that the pharmaceutical companies had
participatedindeveloping the1860brickstructure,
that may have created a user dependency on that
structure at a technical level. If so, that would be
relevant. Equally, in such circumstances, it would
be likely that customers would have to make ex-
ceptional ‘‘organisational and financial’’ efforts in
order to acquire regional sales studies based on
another structure. That might force the rival sup-
plier to offer the rival products on such terms that it
would not be economically viable on a scale com-
parable to IMS.Thatmightmake thebrick structure
indispensable to market access, a question which
the national court had to assess on the facts.
Turning then to question 1, the Court was faced
with argument as to whether theMagill criteria for
compulsory licensing were met. The Court sum-
marised that case and stated that forMagill to apply
it had to be shown that: (i) the refusal to licensewas
preventing the emergence of a new product for
which there was potential consumer demand;
(ii) such refusal was unjustified; and (iii) the
refusal would exclude any competition on a sec-
ondary market.
The Commission argued that it was not necess-
ary for the refusal to be on a separate market to that
in which competition was denied. It simply had to
relate to a ‘‘stage of upstream production’’.
TheCourt’s viewappears tobe that theremust be
two markets, but then suggested ways in which it
may be easy to infer the upstreammarket. Notably,
the fact that anupstreamproductor service (suchas
the delivery service in Bronner) is not marketed
separately, does notmean that a separate upstream
market does not exist, if such a potential or hypo-
thetical market can be identified.
However, then the Court focussed on whether
the refusal to license prevented the emergence of
a new product. The Court noted: ‘‘in the balancing
of the interest in protection of copyright and the
economic freedom of its owner, against the interest
in protection of free competition, the latter can
prevail only where refusal to grant a licence pre-
vents the development of the secondary market to
the detriment of consumers’’83 (emphasis added).
Moreover, a refusal to allow access to a product
protected by copyright, where that product is in-
dispensable for operating on a secondary market
was only abusive: ‘‘where the undertaking which
requested the licence does not intend to limit itself
to duplicating the goods or services already offered
on the secondary market by the owner of the copy-
right, but intends to produce new goods or ser-
vices’’84 (emphasis added). Whether there were, in
fact, two markets here, or whether NDC would
producenewproductswas left to thenational court
to determine.
In practice, the Court therefore summarised that
a refusal to licence would be abusive if:
(1) NDC intended to offer new regional sales
data products or services, not offered by
IMS and for which there is potential con-
sumer demand;
(2) IMS’ refusal is not objectively justified; and
(3) IMS’ refusal reserved to IMS the data ser-
vices market in question by eliminating all
competition therein.
It will be interesting to know what the national
court finds. The criteria are demanding and one
may wonder how ‘‘new’’ a product NDC is really
contemplating or the Court will require.
This remains therefore a hugely controversial
and difficult area, where it is only in exceptional
cases that compulsory licensing will be ordered.
The judgment may also put in doubt the reasoning
in some earlier Commission decisions. In other
words, it is clear that Magill was about a new
product: a comprehensive TV listings guide. It is
less clear that the port cases were about new prod-
ucts, unless one treats new frequencies or types of
transport as new products or services.
In any event, IP holders may be somewhat
pleased with the general respect for their rights,
albeit that the Court is still saying that it is possible
to override such rights in exceptional cases.
What is an agreement?
In the course of the year there have been two
judgments on what constitutes an agreement, fol-
lowing on from Volkswagen I last October.85 First,
in December 2003, the CFI annulled the Commis-
sion’s decision finding that Volkswagen’s calls to
its dealers to raise the prices of VW Passat sales
were unlawful.86 Then, in January 2004, the ECJ
upheld the CFI’s ruling in Bayer Adalat that the
Commission had not proved the existence of
an agreement between Bayer and its Spanish and
Frenchwholesalers topreventparallel imports into
the United Kingdom.87
Volkswagen II
The case was an appeal against the Commission’s
decision in 2001 to fine Volkswagen almost e31
millionfor ‘‘setting thepriceof theVWPassatonthe
basis of exhortations to itsGermanauthoriseddeal-
ers to grant limited discounts or no discounts at all
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to customers in selling the VWPassat’’88 (emphasis
added).
The issue was whether the Commission could
find that therewas anunlawful agreement between
Volkswagen and its dealers, merely because they
hadentered intodistributorship agreementswhich
were then followedupby calls not to discount. The
Commission argued that, by entering into the
underlying distribution agreement, the dealers
had already agreed to follow the manufacturer’s
policy and had therefore agreed to follow such
‘‘exhortations’’ to raise prices. Volkswagen argued
that for an agreement to be caught byArt.81(1) EC it
is necessary to show a ‘‘concurrence of wills’’. One
could not infer from entering into a lawful distri-
butorship agreement that a dealer had agreed to
accept later, unlawful contractual variations. In
order to prove an infringement here, the Commis-
sionhadalso toshowthatdealershad ‘‘acquiesced’’
inoracceptedtheexhortationsin issueand,at least,
hadalsochangedtheirconduct inrelationtoprices.
In short, Volkswagen argued that its actions were
unilateral and that the Commission had not shown
that the dealers acquiesced inVolkswagen’s exhor-
tations not to discount.
The CFI agreed with Volkswagen and was criti-
cal of the Commission’s approach. There had been
other (Court) cases where dealers were found to
have accepted apparently unilateral conduct by a
manufacturer in the context of continuing relations
with dealers. However, the Court stressed that in
such cases the Commission has to establish the
acquiescenceof other contractualpartners, express
or implied, in the attitude adopted by themanufac-
turer. In previous cases it had done so. On the facts
here, the Commission had not shown that the
exhortations in issue were implemented in prac-
tice.89Moreover, theCourt stressed that it couldnot
besaidthatanunlawfulcontractualvariationcould
be accepted as having been accepted in advance
upon and by the signature of a lawful distribution
agreement.90
The Court also rejected the Commission’s in-
terpretationofearlier case law,noting that thecases
concerned turned on distributors accepting con-
duct which was necessarily unlawful, not acqui-
escence in advance to an, as yet, unknownpolicy of
the manufacturer. Other cases had therefore in-
volved a proven concurrence of wills.
Bayer Adalat
In January 2004 the ECJ confirmed the CFI’s judg-
ment overturning the Commission’s Bayer Adalat
decision.91 The Commission and certain pharma-
ceutical importer associationshadappealed.There
are three points of particular interest.
First, the way the parties addressed the under-
lying policy debate. Notably, the Commission ar-
guedthat theCFI’s restrictive interpretationofwhat
constituted an agreement and its stricter require-
ment as to proof thereof called ‘‘into question the
policy pursued by the Commission in fighting
restrictions of competition based on hindrances to
parallel imports’’.92 Bayer, on the other hand, ar-
gued that the Commission was seeking to establish
‘‘hindrance to parallel imports’’ as ‘‘being in itself ’’
an infringement of (what is now)Art.81(1) EC93 and
to catch unilateral measures which could only be
challenged if carried out by a dominant company.
Secondly, the focus of the Court on the specific
issue as towhether an agreement to restrict compe-
tition had been entered into in the circumstances.
Importantly, the ECJ noted that in this case there
was ‘‘a simple refusal to sell and not a sale alleg-
edly subject to certain conditions imposed on dis-
tributors’’.94
TheCourt thenwent on to distinguish anywider
Commission objective. The fact that Bayer’s unilat-
eral policy of quotas and the national requirement
that wholesalers offer a full product range pro-
duced the same effect as an export ban, did not
mean that Bayer had imposed such a ban, nor that
Bayer and the wholesalers had entered into an
agreementnot to export.95AgreeingwithBayer, the
Court observed:
‘‘[t]o hold that an agreement prohibited by [what was
then] Article 85(1) of the Treaty may be established
simply on the basis of the expression of a unilateral
policy aimed at preventing parallel imports would
have the effect of confusing the scope of that provision
with that of Article 86 of the EC Treaty’’.96
Then, in terms entirely in line with the CFI in
Volkswagen, the ECJ went on:
‘‘The mere concomitant existence of an agreement
which is in itself neutral and a measure restricting
competition that has been imposed unilaterally does
not amount to an agreement prohibited by that provi-
sion. Thus, the mere fact that a measure adopted by
a manufacturer, which has the objective or effect of
restricting competition, falls within the context of
continuous business relations between the manufac-
turer and its wholesalers is not sufficient for a finding
that such an agreement exists’’.97
Thirdly, the ECJ distinguished Sandoz,98 which
appears tohavebeenakeypart of theCommission’s
approach here. The Court noted that, in Sandoz, an
agreement was found when Sandoz placed the
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words ‘‘export prohibited’’ on invoices (i.e. de-
manded a particular line of conduct from dealers)
anddealers still paid the relevant invoices andkept
ordering. In other words, the manufacturer had
imposed an export ban which had been tacitly
accepted by the wholesalers.99 Here the Court em-
phasised that Bayer had not imposed an export ban
on its wholesalers and the wholesalers had not
manifested an intent not to export.On the contrary,
wholesalers had taken measures to circumvent
Bayer’s unilateral system in order to keep export-
ing.1
The theme of these judgments for competition
authorities andplaintiffs is clear: Prove the specific
agreementnot toexport bydealersanddistributors,
not just the manufacturer’s desire to achieve that
objective.
Syfait—A.G. Opinion2
InOctober 2004,A.G. Jacobs delivered hisOpinion
in an Art.234 EC reference case from the Greek
Competition Commission, where that Commission
asked the ECJ to clarify whether and in what cir-
cumstances a dominant pharmaceutical company
mayrefuse tomeetorders fromwholesalers inorder
to limit parallel trade.3
The Greek Commission launched an investi-
gation in November 2000, after various Greek asso-
ciations of pharmaceutical wholesalers, including
Syfait, complained that Glaxosmithkline (‘‘GSK’’,
formerly Glaxowellcome) had stopped meeting all
of thewholesalers’ orders for certainproducts.GSK
claimed that wholesalers, by exporting a large pro-
portion of their orders to other EU Member States
where prices were much higher, had caused short-
ageson theGreekmarket.GSKinitiallystated that it
would only supply hospitals and pharmacies, but
subsequently reinstated supplies towholesalers in
limited quantities.
The Greek Commission considered that GSK
enjoyed a dominant position at least in one of the
products in question, ‘‘Lamictal’’ (an anti-epileptic
drug). On that basis, in August 2001, it granted
interim measures and ordered GSK’s Greek sub-
sidiary to meet in full the orders fromwholesalers,
limited to the supplies it received from the parent
company. However, supplies through GSK’s Greek
subsidiarywere sufficient to satisfy the demand on
the Greek market, but not the wholesalers’ much
larger orders for parallel trade. Following hearings,
the Greek Commission decided in January 2003 to
suspend the case and refer various questions to the
ECJ.
The Greek Commission considered that unre-
stricted parallel trade could seriously undermine
the financial interests of pharmaceutical manufac-
turers, eroding their revenues and disrupting their
organisational arrangements in Member States
where products are exported. It also noted that
parallel trade mainly benefited wholesalers rather
than consumers and that, since Member States are
the effective purchasers of most pharmaceutical
products, through health schemes, they can lower
national prices, if they want to pay less.
TheGreekCommission asked theCourtwhether
and on which conditions the protection of legit-
imate commercial interests can justify a restriction
of supply by a dominant pharmaceutical company
in order to limit parallel imports.
A.G. Jacobs noted that, based on the case law of
the Court, a refusal to supply by a dominant under-
taking is an abuse only in exceptional circum-
stances, after close scrutiny of the specific factual
and economic context of each case shows serious
harm to competition.
He considered that a refusal to supply in order to
limit parallel trade does not amount per se to an
abuse within the meaning of Art.82 EC, because a
dominant company is not obliged to meet orders
which are ‘‘out of the ordinary’’ and is justified in
defending its commercial interests.
In particular, as concerns the ‘‘highly specific’’
context of the European pharmaceutical industry,
he considered that a supply restriction in order to
limit parallel trade can be objectively justified, as a
reasonable and proportionate measure to protect
the producers’ legitimate commercial interests.
A.G. Jacobs stressed that his conclusions were
limited to the pharmaceutical market only and
were based on the following three considerations:
— First,pricedifferentialswhichcreateoppor-
tunities forparallel tradeare the result of the
regulated nature of the European pharma-
ceutical market. Companies are justified in
attempting to limit parallel trade because
they are not seeking to entrench price dif-
ferentials of their own making, but to avoid
the negative consequences which would
follow if very low prices in some Member
States were generalised across the Commu-
nity. A requirement tomeet all orderswould,
in many cases, impose a disproportionate
burden, especially given themoral and legal
obligations incumbent on companies to
maintain supplies in all Member States.
— Secondly, a requirement to supply would
harm the incentive for dominant companies
to innovate and invest inR&D, given the low
returns which they could expect during the
period of its patent protection.
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— Thirdly, such parallel trade mainly ben-
efited wholesalers rather than purchasers.
A.G. Jacobs also considered whether the Greek
Commission could be considered as a ‘‘judicial
body’’ under Art.234 EC, despite the fact that only
two out of its nine members are lawyers,4 so that a
reference to the ECJ was admissible.
He concluded that the Commission could be
considered as a ‘‘judicial body’’, because an author-
ity charged with complex technical issues, such as
competition law, is expected to have a lower pro-
portionofmemberswithpure legalbackground.He
also noted that this is in line with Regulation 1/
2003. A generous approach towards references
by national competition authoritieswould provide
an additional safeguard for the uniformity of Com-
munity law.
Clearly an important opinion! It will be interest-
ing to see what the Court now rules.
Cartel cases
Greek Ferries
In December 2003, the CFI generally upheld the
Commission’s decision in the Greek Ferries cartel
cases, while reducing the fines on two compa-
nies.5
It may be recalled that these cases involved
alleged price-fixing and market-sharing between
Italy and Greece. Themarkets concernedwere small
and there was argument about whether govern-
mental involvement in the sector should be treated
as sufficient to suggest that thecompanieshadbeen
instructedorotherwisepressured toenter intosuch
agreements. The Commission rejected such de-
fence claims, but reduced fines in part because it
accepted that there may have been some uncer-
tainty on the issue. As a result of these factors, the
Commission treated a ‘‘very serious’’ infringement
as a ‘‘serious’’ one and tailored the fines to the small
market size.
The companies concerned still appealed. Sev-
eral points are of interest.
First, the CFI found that one company, Ven-
touris, had been fined too much because the Com-
mission had treated the infringement as a single
continuous one whereas, in fact, the infringement
should have been divided into two, one related to
passenger services and another related to cargo
services. Since Ventouris had only been involved
in the cargo infringement, which only concerned a
smaller market on specific routes and which was
about one quarter of the passenger services mar-
ket, its fine was reduced from e1.01 million to
e252,000.6The fine onanother company,Adriatica
di Navigazione, was similarly reduced from
e980,000 to e245,000.
Secondly, the companies contested the lawful-
ness of the Commission’s investigation, insofar as
the Commission had carried out a ‘‘dawn raid’’ on
premises believed to belong to Minoan Lines, but
which were in fact those of Minoan’s agent, a
company called the European Trust Agency
(‘‘ETA’’). After a detailed review, the Court found
that theCommissioncouldvalidly investigate such
third party premises since the Commission was
entitled to treat them as the premises of Minoan.
On the facts, the Court noted that ETA had been
given the power to represent Minoan in the inves-
tigation and the premises were the real centre of
Minoan’s activities. The Court also found that ETA
wasoperatingasasingleeconomicunitwithMinoan.
Thirdly, insofar as on appeal some companies
contested findings of fact related to the infringe-
ment, the Commission asked the CFI to remove the
20 per cent reduction of fines which had been
granted in the Commission’s proceedings for not
contesting the facts and to increase the fines ac-
cordingly. The Court rejected this. The Court’s
view, echoing that taken in the Stora case, was
that the companies could not be prevented from
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Box 4
— Cartel cases
* Greek Ferries:
 Can the Commission ask for increased
fines for appeals of the facts?
* Cement
 Company acquired after infringement
not part of relevant turnover for fine.
* Graphite Electrodes
 Very detailed review by CFI of the way
the Commission applied the fining
guidelines
 Fine increases may be made in some
cases (2 per cent here) (Time for a new
rule?)
 What does a company have to give in
response to a request for information?
Even notes of cartel meetings?!
* Seamless steel tubes
 Voluntary restraint not legal protection,
just politics
 Fine increase discussed, but decrease in
circumstances
* German banks
 Weak evidence
 Beware the fax!
* Dutch electro-technical Fittings
wholesalers
 Unilateral collective exclusive dealing
agreement
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exercising their appeal remedies normally under
the Treaty. In particular, a company could not be
criticised for disagreeingwith themanner inwhich
the Commission obtained documents and could
also contest the manner in which the Commission
appraised thosedocuments as evidence of a cartel.7
(This issue has come up also in Graphite Elec-
trodes, described below.)
Finally, on the substance, the CFI predictably
upheld the Commission’s approach on govern-
mental action. It is a difficult defence plea to
make out, since the Court insists on clear evidence
that conductwas required by governmental action.
Wholesalers of electro-technical fittings
In December 2004, the CFI dismissed two appli-
cations for annulment of the Commission’s decision
in the Dutch electro-technical wholesalers fittings
cartel case.8
It may be recalled that CEF Holdings Ltd, a UK
wholesale distributor for electro-technical fittings,
faced difficulties entering the Dutch market and
lodged a complaint with the Commission. After a
somewhat protracted investigation, in October
1999 the Commission found that FEG, a Dutch asso-
ciation of wholesalers of electro-technical fittings,
had infringed Art.81(1) EC by entering into a col-
lective exclusive dealing arrangement intended to
prevent supplies to non-members of the FEG. This
arrangement had included an agreement with NA-
VEG, a Dutch association of ‘‘Exclusive (supplier)
Representatives’’ in the electro-technical sector and
concertedpracticeswith suppliers not represented
in NAVEG. Moreover, the Commission found that
FEG had restricted the freedom of its members to
determinesellingprices individually.Onecompany,
Technische Unie (‘‘TU’’) which was one of FEG’s
members, was also accused of taking active part in
these infringements. The Commission imposed a
fine ofe4.4million onFEGande2.15million onTU.
In January2000, bothTUandFEGappealed.The
CFI upheld theCommission’s finding that FEGhad
entered into a collective exclusive dealing arrange-
mentaimedatpreventingsupplies tonon-members
of the FEG.
The infringement comprised (i) a gentlemen’s
agreement between FEG and NAVEG by which
NAVEG undertook that it would advise its mem-
bers not to sell electro-technical fittings to whole-
salers not belonging to the FEG; and (ii) concerted
practiceswhereby the FEG and itsmembers sought
to extend that agreement to certain suppliers not
belonging to NAVEG. The exclusive dealing ar-
rangement, however, was not reciprocal, meaning
that FEG members were, in principle, free to pur-
chase products from firms which were not party to
the agreement.
On appeal, FEG argued that the ‘‘unilateral’’
collective exclusive dealing arrangement was ‘‘de-
void of purpose’’ and that NAVEGmembers had no
interest in concluding such an arrangement. How-
ever, the Court rejected this argument, pointing out
that FEG had 96 per cent of the Dutch wholesale
market for electro-technical fittings and still some
50 per cent if a broader market definition were
taken, including direct distribution from suppliers
to retailers. In short, FEG had purchasing power
which could not be disregarded by NAVEG mem-
bers.
As regards the concerted practices aimed at ex-
tending the exclusive dealing arrangement to
undertakingsnotbelonging toNAVEG,FEGdenied
that they could be attributed to it as an association,
arguing that they should be attributed to its mem-
bers. TheCourt rejected this aswell, noting that the
respective actions concerned the same object,
shared the same beneficiaries andwere implemen-
ted by the members and certain executives of the
FEG. As a result, they should be deemed attribu-
table to that association.
Finally, the applicants argued that the adminis-
trative procedure had been excessive in duration.
Eight and a half years had passed from the com-
plaint until theCommission eventually adopted its
decision in 1999. It was argued that this was not a
reasonable period for proceedings which are likely
to lead to penalties.
However, theCFI rejectedthisalso.QuotingA.G.
Mischo in the PVC II case,9 the CFI considered that
it was necessary in considering the reasonableness
of such an extended procedure to make a distinc-
tion between the investigative phase prior to the
Statement of Objections and the rest of the admin-
istrative procedure.
In thiscontext, theCourtdrewananalogybetween
criminal and competition law observing that, in
criminalmatters, the reasonableness of the time for
a procedure referred to in Art.6(1) of the European
Human Rights Convention ran from the timewhen
a person is charged. Similarly, the CFI considered
that the fact that a procedure was long up to the
StatementofObjections,wasnot in itself capableof
affecting the rights of defence.
Here the administrative procedure after the
Statement of Objections had taken more than 39
months. The reasonableness of this had to be as-
sessedby reference to the specific circumstances of
the case. In this case, the Court concluded that the
16months that had elapsed between the Statement
of Objections and the Hearing of the parties were
not excessive.However, the23monthsbetween the
Hearing and the final decision exceeded the period
which, in the normal course of events, would be
needed for adoption of the decision. Since the
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Commission had already reduced the fines in the
case by e100,000 on both FEG and TV to deal with
this, the appeal was rejected.
The CFI considered that the uncertainty and
adverse effects on reputation involved in such
proceedings were just inherent in Regulation 17
procedures.
With respect, this is a somewhat harsh and
narrow approach. Practically, one can understand
that procedures with new issues and multiple
defendants can take time, but five years between
complaint and Statement of Objections is not ad-
equate, either for the Commission (with staff mo-
bility every five years) or the parties. One may also
question whether this issue is just about the rights
of thedefence.Shouldnot thisbeaquestionofgood
administration, a principle which might sensibly
be used to promote quicker procedures?
Cement
In January 2004, the ECJ gave judgment on the
appeals brought by six companies from the CFI
judgments in the cement cartel case.10
In November 1994, the Commission had im-
posed fines, totalling e248 million on companies
anda trade associationwhichhadbeen involved in
various anti-competitive practices on the grey and
white cementmarkets. TheCommission’s long and
detailed decision found, amongst other practices:
agreementsonnon-transshipmentbetweenEUcoun-
tries, specific agreements on market-sharing, and
collectiveactiontopreventexportsofGreekcement
to Italy, the United Kingdom and other countries.
In 2000, the CFI reduced the amount of the fines
imposed by e140 million.11 The Court found that
(i) the Commission had not adequately proved
participation by some companies in the cartel;
(ii) some of these had participated for shorter per-
iods of time than claimed by the Commission; and
(iii) two of the companies had been deprived of
evidence which might have aided their defence.
In consequence their fines were annulled. In ad-
dition, the CFI found that the Statement of Objec-
tionshadnot indicatedanintentiontofine thetrade
association, so its fine was annulled.
The ECJ largely upheld the CFI’s judgment.
First, in the case of Ciments franc¸ais, the ECJ
found that turnover of a Belgian subsidiary had
beenincorrectly includedincalculating theapplic-
able fine. This subsidiary had not come under the
control of Ciments franc¸ais until October 1990, i.e.
after the infringement ended. The fine on Ciments
franc¸ais was reduced by just under e4 million to
e9.6 million accordingly.12
Secondly, the ECJ confirmed the correctness
of the CFI’s approach on a number of procedural
issues. Notably:
— The CFI had been correct not to annul the
decisiondespite theCommission’s acknow-
ledgment that it had denied access to three
quarters of the documents in its file.
— Before any such annulment it had to be
shown that the lack of sufficient access to
the file prevented access to documents
whichwere likely to be of use in the compa-
nies’ defence.13
— By ordering measures of organisation, al-
lowing the parties to review the file to see
if there were material documents, which
they could have used in their defence, the
CFI had also not attempted to replace the
Commission in its investigative role. It had
merely carried out a provisional examin-
ationof theevidence toassesswhether there
hadbeen an infringement of the rights of the
defence.14
— Furthermore, to justify a finding of a ma-
terial error, the CFI had been correct to hold
that it was necessary to determine an ‘‘ob-
jective link’’ between the documents with-
held by the Commission and an objection
contained in the decision.15
— The CFI was also correct in its view that the
test for when lack of access to a document
might justify annulment of thedecisionwas
whether, following disclosure, there would
have been even a small chance of the out-
come of the administrative procedure being
altered.16
One senses that the ECJ, like the CFI, was not
supportive of technical procedural challenges to
this enormous decision in an enormous case.
Thirdly, the ECJ also found that an interested
party is not entitled to be informed by the Commis-
sion if the latter drops certain objections (here in
relation to certain conduct on the Italianmarket).17
It is only necessary to inform awould-be addressee
of such a decision if there would be a material
alteration in the evidence relied on in a decision,
or if new facts would be taken into account.18
Fourthly, the CFI was correct to reject Irish
Cement’s argument that it had a right to cross
examine the authors of certain documents. The
procedure before the Commission is purely admin-
istrative and there is no requirement that cross
examination be permitted.19
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Graphite Electrodes
In April 2004, the CFI issued its judgment in vari-
ous appeals against the Commission’s Graphite
Electrodes decision.20 It may be recalled that this
decision involved a worldwide price-fixing and
market-sharing cartel for electric arc furnaces,
which are mainly used to make steel.21 Fines total-
ling some e220 million were imposed. Eight Euro-
pean, American and Japanese firmswere involved.
There were parallel proceedings in the United
States and Canada.
Therewere seven appeals, leading to significant
reductions of fines, essentially on the basis that the
Commission has misapplied its own fining guide-
lines. In one case, the CFI also increased a fine, in
the sense that it modified the reduction in fine
which the Commission had given the company.
Overall, the fines on the seven companies con-
cerned were reduced from e207.2 million to
e152.8 million.
The case is interesting for a number of points.
First, although theCourt stated that theCommis-
sion has a large measure of discretion in fining, it
stressed that the Commission must apply its own
fining guidelines strictly. In particular, there should
be respect for the principles of proportionality and
equal treatment as between the cartel offenders.
Interestingly, in this case theCourtwas alsowilling
to look closely at the evidence which the Commis-
sion relied on for each element of the guidelines, in
order to see if there were ‘‘manifest errors’’ in their
application.
The result is that the CFI checked the Commis-
sion’s positions in detail and, in several ways, dis-
agreed with the Commission’s findings, leading
to significant reductions in almost all of the fines
imposed. Thus, the largest fine was reduced from
e80.2 million to e69.1 million and others were
simply halved.22 Amongst other things, the Court
reviewed (and corrected) whether firms had been
placed in the right ‘‘size categories’’ for the starting
amountof fines; theamountofmultiplierappliedto
a firm for deterrence; and the importance of the
cooperation of companies to the Commission’s
case.
Secondly, the Court rejected the argument that
fines and damages paid for the infringement out-
side the EEA should be taken into account in
assessing EU fines. The Court held that such sanc-
tions penalised infringements with impacts on
different markets. However, the Court confirmed
that fines or damages paid for infringements inside
theEUare tobe taken intoaccount, since theyapply
to the same territory.23 The Court also found that it
was not unlawful for the Commission to consider
worldwide turnover derived from sales of the rel-
evant product in order to evaluate the economic
capacityof the cartelmembers toharmcompetition
in the EEA.24
Thirdly, the Court found that a company which
cooperates through oral communications should
be given credit for that cooperation under the le-
niencyprogramme.25On the facts,UCARhadgiven
information orally, which was later confirmed in
written statements, but the Commission had not
givenUCARcredit for theoral information.TheCFI
said that was wrong because the information had
been useful to the Commission’s investigation.
Fourthly, the Court again had to deal with re-
quests by the Commission to increase fines im-
posed where firms had challenged the findings of
fact in the case on appeal, while receiving a re-
duction in the fine imposed for not contesting the
facts.26 The Commission asked for increases of at
least 10 per cent.
The Court’s approach here was more nuanced
than in Greek Ferries. The Court stated:
— If a firm has expressly, clearly and specifi-
cally acknowledged the facts, it is estopped,
in principle, from disputing them on ap-
peal.27
— If a firm does not expressly acknowledge
facts, the Commissionmust prove themand
a company can put forward any plea in
defence which it deems appropriate.
— If the Commission’s case is not clear and the
firmconcerned considers that the facts have
been misinterpreted, it can raise such an
issueonappeal.Thatwas thecaseheresince
the Commission had relied on general con-
duct and no-contest statements, rather than
specifics.
— However, if a company does so, it may lose
the 10per cent reduction for co-operation or
partof it,where thecompanyhasobligedthe
Commission to put forward further evi-
dence, or todraft a defence on such an issue.
— A company is also entitled to put ‘‘a fresh
legal complexion’’ on documentary evidence
previously submitted in the procedure.28
On the facts, this led to an increase of one fine by
2 per cent29 (i.e. a reduction for non-contestation of
the facts from 10 per cent to 8 per cent).
This has become undesirably complex. Perhaps
it is inevitable because the fines are so high and
their level turns on precise facts. However, one
would think that a solution would be to give com-
panies a ‘‘draft preliminary findings of fact’’
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20. Cases T–236/01 and others,Tokai Carbon v Commis-
sion, judgment of April 29, 2004.
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27. [108]–[109].
28. [288].
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document, before the formal Statement of Objec-
tions, so that they can check it and co-operate with
the Commission inmaking sure that it has the facts
right.At themoment, companies are facedwith the
Statement of Objections and know that if they
‘‘contest’’ it that may be perceived as a ground for
denying them a 10 per cent reduction in fines. As a
result, companiesmaynot clarifyparticularpoints,
which can lead to disputes later, when the compa-
nies realise that fines are much higher as a result.
Fifthly, the Court upheld appeals that compa-
nies shouldbegivencredit forprovidinganswers to
Commission requests for information, which went
further than legally permitted. In other words, the
CFI found that the Commission had asked compa-
nies not only purely factual questions and for
existing documents, but also to describe what hap-
pened at meetings and for the results/conclusions
and for protocols and other material disclosing the
contents of meetings which the Commission sus-
pected involved infringements.
Applying Orkem and Mannesmannro¨hren-
Werke,30 the Court held that such material did not
have tobeprovided, since it involvedadmissionsof
the infringements concerned. By providing that
information, the companies were therefore not act-
ing pursuant to a legal obligation andwere entitled
to credit for their voluntary waiver of their defence
rights.31 The result is that the Commission had to
give companies ‘‘co-operation credit’’ for answer-
ing requests for informationwhich go beyondwhat
the Commissionwas legally entitled to ask for. The
Courtalsoheld thatacompanyisnot requiredto tell
the Commission facts which will be used to in-
crease its fine (i.e. here that it had warned another
company of an investigation32). TheCommission is
appealing these points.
Finally, the Court confirmed that the Commis-
sion is not obliged to give a reduction for the
financial difficulties facing the cartel participants
(although it may choose to do so in its discretion,
where appropriate). It is argued that many cartels
arise because a sector is in difficulty and therefore
such an obligation would require the Commission
to give such a reduction in most cases.
Seamless Steel Tubes
In July 2004, the CFI gave judgment on appeals to
the Seamless Steel Tubes decision.33
The Commission had found a market-sharing
agreement between European and Japanese pro-
ducers of seamless carbon-steel pipes and tubes,
so-called ‘‘Oil Country Tubular Goods’’ (‘‘OCTG’’)
and ‘‘Line Pipes’’ used to transport oil and gas. This
was called the ‘‘Europe-Japan Club’’. The Commis-
sion had fined the eight companies, with amounts
totalling e99 million. Seven of the eight brought
annulment actions which the CFI largely rejected.
However, the fineswere reduced bye13million on
two grounds.
First, itmaybe recalled that theCommissionhad
taken into account the existence of voluntary ex-
port restraints and similar measures concluded
between the Commission and Japan between 1972
and 1990 to conclude that fines should only be
imposed from the beginning of 1990 onwards.34
The parties claimed that the voluntary restraints
continued until the end of 1990. Since the Com-
mission was for some reason unable to produce
evidence to the contrary from its archives, the CFI
upheld the position of the companies.
In addition, in the case of the Japanese compa-
nies, the Commission was found not to have ad-
equately proved that the infringement lasted beyond
July 1, 1994, although it had claimed that the
infringement ceased at the beginning of 1995. As a
result, the period in respect of which the fine was
calculated for the Japanesecompanieswas reduced
from five to three and a half years and the relevant
period for theEuropeancompanieswas reducedby
one year.
It should be noted also that the Commission did
not treat the voluntary restraints as obliging it to
reduce the fines concerned, particularly because
the old 1972 Commission Notice on Imports from
Japan stated that no comfort could be drawn from
voluntary restraint agreements as regards the ap-
plication of competition law. Rather, the reduc-
tions were viewed as political concessions.35
Secondly, the CFI reduced the Japanese compa-
nies’ fines for breach of the principle of equal
treatment. The European companies had commit-
ted an additional, separate infringement of Art.81
EC, but the Commission had not taken account of
this in determining the amount of their fines.36 In
this respect, different situations had been treated
identically. The CFI stated that the logical way to
remedy this would have been to increase the fines
payable by the European companies.37 However,
the Commission had not argued this point in its
defence and had only raised it at the hearing.38
Given that the European companies had therefore
been unable to give their views on a possible in-
crease in their fines, the CFI decided that it would
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bemore appropriate to reduce the fines imposedon
the Japanese companies.39
German Banks–Eurozone
In October 2004, the CFI annulled the Commis-
sion’s decision concerning the alleged involve-
ment of German banks in an agreement to fix the
way of charging and the actual charge for convert-
ing currency into Euros in the transitional period
before the Euro was introduced.40
The Commission had found such an agreement
on the basis of two accounts of a meeting in 1997
betweenGerman banks, corroborated in its viewby
statementsmade at theOralHearing in the case and
the banks’ actual behaviour.
The Commission considered that there was (at
least some) consensus that a percentage commis-
sion be used for such exchange and on a target
commission of about 3 per cent (to achieve 90 per
cent recovery of the income which banks made
previouslyoncurrencyexchange throughcurrency
buying and selling rate differentials).
The banks put forward alternative arguments.
Notably, that there had been no actual agreement.
In fact, the agreed communication to the German
Bundesbank after the relevant meeting had stated
that eachbankwoulddecide for itself the form tobe
taken by its future charging structure.
On the facts, the Court found for the applicant.
All this occurred byway of a ruling on judgment in
default since, owing to a faxing error, the Commis-
sion had not submitted its Defence in time. What
theCourtdid thereforewas toassess theapplicant’s
arguments against those in the Commission’s de-
cision, but without the Defence. In such circum-
stances the Court did not consider theCommission’s
decision to be founded on sufficiently cogent evi-
dence on the way charges were to be made or their
amount.41
Other
In January 2004, the CFI reduced the fine imposed
by the Commission on JCB from e39.6 million to
e30 million.42 It will be recalled that JCB produces
construction site, earth moving and agricultural
machinery/equipment.43 The Court upheld two
out of the five elements of the infringement which
theCommissionhad found.Thus, theCourtupheld
Commission findings of restrictions onpassive sales
by JCB’s distributors and restrictions on sources of
supply on some dealers. However, the Court con-
sidered that there was not adequate evidence of
other findings: that JCB fixed discounts or resale
pricesof itsdistributors in theUnitedKingdomand
France; that JBC imposedservice support feeson its
UK distributors selling to other Member States, or
that JCB withdrew trading support from agents in
theUnitedKingdom in the case of sales outside the
territory.
In April 2004, the ECJ dismissed British Sugar’s
appeal against the CFI’s judgment upholding the
Commission’s British industrial and retail sugar
decision.44 The Court upheld the CFI’s assessment
of effect on trade between Member States and
rejected other challenges to the CFI’s review of the
fines imposed.45
In September 2004, the CFI also ruled that the
International Olympic Committee’s anti-doping
regulations were not subject to EC Competition
law, being purely sporting rules which do not
pursue any economic objective.46
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In Pt 2, to be published in Issue 3, the author
will outline:
 RecentCommissioncartel,co-operationand
distributioncases, inareas suchasnational
recycling schemes, airline alliances, finan-
cial services, and the distribution of Poke´-
mon stickers.
 Various new proposed ‘‘commitment deci-
sions’’ for the German Bundesliga, Coca-
Cola’s rebate system and Repsol’s service
stations in Spain.
 The Commission’s Art.82 EC decision in
Microsoft.
 Policy issues, such as a possible extension
of in-house privilege.
 The Commission’s recent drive to promote
competition in the liberalprofessionwitha
decision involving Belgian Architects.
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